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I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

Summary
We should learn from the Court’s decision in Dolan

City o f Tigard this

Term whether the current Court is willing to continue down the Takings Clause path
first charted out by Justice Scalia in his opinion for the Court in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). There are only five Justices now on the
Court who were sitting on the bench at the time Nollan was decided —three from the
majority and two from the dissent -- and while the Court is generally more
conservative in 1994 than it was in 1987, it is far from clear whether Nollan will be
reaffirmed and expanded or, instead, sharply limited. The most interesting issue in
the case concerns the extent to which the Court accepts the plaintiff’s claim that the
Takings Clause requires government to demonstrate a fairly close fit between the
conditions the government would like to place on resource development and the
actual, proven impacts of that development. Such permit conditions and exactions are
a regular feature of government regulation in environmental and natural resource law.
The record in the case supporting the City’s permit conditions is much
stronger than the Court likely realized at the time that the Court granted certiorari,
which makes affirmance of the state supreme court’s rejection of the takings challenge
possible, notwithstanding that the Court likely granted review expecting to reverse.
At oral argument, however, several of the "swing" Justices still seemed somewhat
skeptical of the fairness of the conditions and concerned about the possibility that the
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plaintiff may have been singled out because of the City’s desire for easements on her
property rather than because of the City’s general concern with flood hazards and
traffic congestion.

B.

References

Dolan v. City of Tigard, S. Ct. No. 93-518 (pending)
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey
o f American Practices, 50 Law & Contemp. Probs. 51 (1987)
Richard Epstein, Bargaining with the State (1993)
Richard Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits o f Consent,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 5 (1988)
Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality o f Imposing Increased Community Costs on
New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 Yale L. J. 1119 (1964)
Jerold Kayden, Land Use Regulation, Rationality, and Judicial Review: The RSVP in
the Nollan Invitation (Part I), 23 Urb. Law. 301 (1991)
Daniel Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption o f Constitutionality in
Land Use Law, 24 Urb. Law. 1 (1992)
Frank Michelman, Takings 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1988)
Stewart Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1731 (1988)
R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit
Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History o f Land Development Exactions,
50 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5 (1988)
Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1415 (1989)
Glen Summers, Private Property Without Lochner, Toward A Takings Jurisprudence
Uncorrupted by Substantive Due Process, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 837 (1993) (student
comment)
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:PERMIT CONDITIONS AND THE TAKINGS CLAUS
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Why Permit Conditions/Exactions Are So Important To Regulators And
The Potential For Their Abuse In Environmental And Natural Resources
Law
Permit conditions and exactions are frequently the rule rather than the

exception in environmental and natural resource law. Whether by statute or by
regulation, centralized government tends to restrict private property rights in natural
resources based on generalizations and rough categories. By contrast, the natural
environment that is the object of these restrictions tends to resist easy application of
the generalizations underlying those laws. Permit conditions and exactions provide a
means for more finely tuning the regulatory process and for achieving a better
accommodation between competing private and public interests in natural resource
development, conservation, and preservation.
B.

Why The Takings Clause Applies To Permit Conditions;
California

CoastalCommission. 483 U.S. 825 (1987)

While providing a means for fine tuning and accommodation, the permit
condition process also invites the potential for government abuse and overreaching.
Most simply put, government can use the threat of police power restrictions to exact
transfers of wealth from private parties to the government. To prevent government
from misusing its police power authority in this fashion, the Supreme Court in Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), held that the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause limited the grounds on which government could decide to
lift an otherwise permissible police power restriction. At issue in the case was a
police power restriction on the height of residences along the California coast, which
the California Coastal Commission agreed to lift in exchange for the homeowner
agreeing to provide the public with an easement of lateral access along the beach in
front of the house. The Court held that the permit condition amounted to an
unconstitutional taking because the objectives served by the permit condition did not
bear sufficient relation to the ends served by the police power restriction being lifted
by that condition.
3

The Court’s holding that the Takings Clause, rather than simply the Due
Process Clause, limits the permissible scope of permit conditions and exactions is not
irresistible, which is also why the case is significant. Left unsettled post-Nollan is
whether the Court intends to invoke the Takings Clause to limit permit conditions
other than the kind of easement at issue in Nollan, which implicated the Court’s
traditional Takings Clause concern with physical invasions. The Nollan majority also
strongly intimated that the Takings Clause required a tighter means/ends fit —
substantially advancing —than the "reasonable relationship" traditionally required in
Due Process analysis. Finally, the Nollan Court raised, but did not decide, how
closely related the permit condition must be to the restriction being lifted. The Court
did not have to reach the issue, having concluded that there was no relationship at all
in Nollan.

C.

Why The Supreme Court Granted Review In

Do
.lan
v City O f

TiS.
gard,

Ct. No, 93-518 (pending)
The most likely reason that at least four Justices voted to grant review in
Dolan was to reaffirm and underscore the Court’s ruling in Nollan. The impact of
Nollan in lower court litigation had been modest, at best. The petition for certiorari
in Dolan, coupled with a strong dissent in the Oregon Supreme Court, created the
distinct impression that the Oregon Supreme Court had given mere lip service to
Nollan, and had required the challenged state law to do no more than pass muster
under a mere "rational basis" standard. The dissent also strongly suggested that the
permit condition at issue in that case — which, as in Nollan, involved easements and
public access -- was both wholly out of proportion to the character and degree of the
government’s legitimate interests in the plaintiff’s proposed development and nothing
more than an attempt by the City to obtain public parkland without paying just
compensation to the landowner.
In Dolan, the plaintiff sought a permit to double the size of an existing
hardware and plumbing store on a downtown lot in Tigard, Oregon. The lot is
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adjacent to a creek that had flooded portions of the downtown in the past, and the
City had previously designated part of the lot a floodplain and restricted development
on that portion. Pursuant to City ordinance, the landowner’s proposed development —
which did not involve constructing any portion of the building within the floodplain
designation — amounted to a "major development," requiring a City permit. The City
agreed to issue the necessary permit, but only upon the landowner agreeing to
dedicate two separate easements to the City: (1) an easement near the creek, on
which the City would construct a drainage ditch; and (2) an easement on which the
City would construct a bicycle/pedestrian pathway. The City asserted that the
drainage easement was necessary because the proposed development would increase
the amount of impervious surface area, thereby increasing flood risks, and that the
pathway was necessary to alleviate existing traffic congestion problems that the
proposed development would exacerbate. The City subsequently denied plaintiff’s
request for a variance from these restrictions.
III.

TH E STAKES IN

DOLAN:W HAT TO LOOK FOR IN TH E COURT’S

OPINION - W HITHER

NO LLAN

Only five of the nine justices who originally decided Nollan are still on the Court:
three from the majority (Rehnquist, O ’Connor, and Scalia) and two from the dissent
(Blackmun and Stevens). This case therefore provides the opportunity to see whether the
current Court is interested in accepting Nollan

apparent invitation to subject land use

regulations to heightened judicial Takings Clause scrutiny or is instead now ready to limit the
Nollan ruling. The Court’s perspective on Nollan can be gleaned from its treatment of a
variety of issues, described below.
A.

Due Process Or Takings
Although the City, the United States, and most of the other amici supporting

the City shied away from suggesting to the Court that the Due Process Clause, rather
than the Takings Clause, should govern these issues, it is possible that the Court
might revisit Nollan’s premise. But unlikely. Certainly the oral argument offered no
hint of that occurring.
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B.

Presumptions. Burdens Of Proof, And Variance Procedures
Much of Dolan turns on who has the burden of proof to demonstrate what,

when. The Court has long asserted that legislation is entitled to a presumption of
constitutionality, but has left fairly muddled precisely how that presumption operates
in a takings case. For instance, what is the significance of that presumption in terms
of the initial showing that a property owner must make in order to place the onus
back on the government to justify its action. The burden issue was a source of some
dispute between the majority and dissent in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), and promises to be so again in Dolan, because of the
uncertainty inevitably surrounding the impacts that the plaintiff’s proposed
development would actually have on flood hazards and traffic congestion.

There is

also necessarily uncertainty surrounding the extent to which the City’s conditions will
redress those impacts. Further complicating the inquiry in Dolan (likely in the City’s
favor) was the existence of a variance procedure that the plaintiff pursued, but without
trying to refute the City’s assumptions regarding the development’s impact.
C.

Levels Of Scrutiny: "Specifically And Uniquely Attributable,"
"Substantially Related," "Reasonably Related." "Rationally Related." and
"Wholly Out Of Proportion"
The most significant part of the Court’s ruling is likely to be how the Court

characterizes the relationship that the Takings Clause requires between the permit
condition and the police power restriction being lifted and, even more importantly, the
degree to which the permit condition must be proportional to the burdens of the
proposed development. For instance, to what extent must the City demonstrate the
precise amount of flood hazards attributable to the plaintiff’s proposed development
and to what extent must the burdens imposed by the drainage easement be somehow
considered proportional to those incremental hazards. Likewise, to what extent must
the City demonstrate the impact on traffic congestion of the plaintiff’s proposed
development and to what extent must the burdens imposed by the easement for the
bicycle/pedestrian be proportional to that impact. (Must, for instance, the pathway be
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intended to serve the transportation needs of the plaintiff’s store or is it sufficient that
the pathway will generally reduce traffic congestion).
In Nollan, the Court addressed only the first matter —the relationship between
the initial police power restriction and the permit condition -- and concluded that there
had to be some relationship without characterizing what the relationship must be. The
Court did not address the second issue directly, because, having found no
relationship, the Court did not have to define what the relationship must be. But the
Court nonetheless strongly intimated that the Takings Clause required some
proportionality inquiry. While the City and the plaintiff in this case sharply disagree
on the question of what relationship the record establishes -- with the City claiming
that it can, but should not have to, meet a heightened standard — much of their
respective briefs, and those of their supporting amici, focus on the proper
characterization of the relationship test.
C.

Fairness And Subterfuge
The Court’s primary concern in Nollan, which will not disappear in Dolan is

the possibility of government using police power restrictions and permit conditions to
single out some property owners for excessive burdens. At oral argument in Dolan,
several of the Justices were plainly concerned about the possibility that the plaintiff
had been unfairly singled out. In particular, they were concerned that the City might
not be requiring other developers to mitigate the flood hazard and traffic impacts of
their development and had simply singled out those property owners, like Dolan, who
happened to own property in an area where the government sought easements to
further the City’s desire to have green ways and a bicycle/pedestrian pathway.
Whether the City persuaded the Justices that the plaintiff was not being singled out
and that developers elsewhere had to abide by comparable (not identical) permit
conditions is likely to be critical to the City’s chances of obtaining a favorable ruling.
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D.

The Finer Points

1.

Accounting for the Benefits of Regulation in Considering the
Constitutionality of Its Burdens
Government lawyers have long argued that courts should not

consider the burdens of regulations without simultaneously taking into
consideration the benefits the regulation confer on private property. And
there is some support in the case law for doing so. In Dolan, government
lawyers (for both the City and the United States as amicus curiae) placed
heavy emphasis on the disproportional benefits that the plaintiff would
receive from the permit conditions, because of the proximity of her
property to the creek and the commercial advantages to her business of
reduced traffic congestion. At the oral argument, however, the Justices
seemed divided regarding the significance of the benefit inquiry.
2.

Distinguishing Between Governmental Objectives: Public Safety
(Floodplains and Traffic Congestion) vs. Public Welfare (Bike Paths
and Greenwavs)
Some lawyers involved in the case thought that the record

supporting the easement condition for the drainage ditch was stronger than
the record in favor of the easement for the bicycle/pedestrian pathway,
partly because the Court might be more sympathetic to the purposes served
by the former. Others thought, for similar reasons, that the greenway
aspects of the City’s plan were the most vulnerable. At oral argument,
some of the Justices (including Kennedy) appeared interested in
distinguishing between the two easements and the City’s various objectives.
3.

Assessing Expectations: Downtown Commercial vs. Residential
Property
This case is potentially distinguishable from Nollan, by analogy to

PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), on the theory that
easements are less disruptive of the property owner’s expectations when the
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property at issue is downtown commercial property (as in PruneYard) rather
than residential property (as in Nollan).
4.

Allowing for Thresholds and Cumulative Impacts
The kind of strict proportionality analysis sought by the plaintiff in this

case, if adopted by the Court, could limit government’s ability to redress
cumulative impacts, which are, by definition, not readily attributable to any
one isolable regulated activity. It could also limit the government’s ability to
use "rules of thumb" and thresholds in devising police power regulations and
permit conditions. These issues were themes within the briefs filed by the
City and the United States.
III.

SUPREME SPECULATION: COUNTING THE POSSIBLE VOTES (FOR THE
GOVERNMENT)

A.

The

B.

The New Voices on the Court

C.

Nollan

Dissenters:Relying on Stevens and Blackmun

1.

Hoping for Souter and Ginsburg

2.

Reaching for Kennedy

The

Nollan Majority (minus 2 (Powell and White), plus 1 (Thoma

1.

Concerned About O ’Connor

2.

Dreaming of Rehnquist

3.

Scalia (and Thomas) NOT!
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